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Introduction
There is a great temptation to seek particular contexts within which heinous crimes may have
been committed so that these may serve as both explanations and justifications for such crimes.
The context thus becomes responsible for human rights abuses and the individual authors of these
crimes are denied both agency and culpability.2 This paper tries to demonstrate that it is
necessary to avoid such temptations if a normative framework based on the rule of law is to be
developed n South Africa.
At the heart of the search for a durable democratic order in South Africa lies the question of how
to deal with the violence committed in defence of and in opposition to Apartheid. This question
formed a critical part of the negotiations leading to the demise of the former authoritarian regime
since the risk of punishment for human rights abuses made apartheid leaders reluctant to
surrender power without protection against prosecution and other assurances.3 While the question
was partially addressed in the provisions for pardoning the perpetrators of violence in the final
clause of the interim constitution4 which ensued from the negotiations, it remains vitally
important in contemporary South Africa. The manner in which we confront it has far reaching
consequences for the possibilities of establishing a normative framework based on the rule of law
and for safeguarding democracy. This paper deals with some of these implications. In general
it is concerned with the constraints and possibilities of the negotiated settlement in South Africa
in relation to questions of justice. In particular, it deals with the relationship between an
unreformed criminal justice system and the process of granting amnesty to the perpetrators of
violence both in defence of apartheid and in the struggle against it. The paper highlights the
various dimensions of these separate processes and examines where they overlap, how they
strain at each other and what efforts have been made to resolve the tensions. Institutionally, the
paper deals with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, (specifically its Amnesty Committee
and its Investigative Unit), on the one hand, and the offices of the Attorneys General and the
judiciary on the other. The objectives of the two are clearly contradictory. While the former
seeks a basis for reconciliation in revealing as full a picture of past abuses as possible,3 the latter
is concerned with the daily administration of justice. The former tries to indemnify criminals and
the latter tries to prosecute them.
The paper commences with a discussion of the political and social context which gave rise to the
formation of the TRC and the compromises in the negotiated settlement around the granting of
amnesty to the perpetrators of gross violations of human rights in defence of Apartheid. It goes
on to explore the relation between the criminal justice system and the truth and reconciliation
process by focussing on the contradictory objectives of the two in relation to how perpetrators
should be treated. In short, should they be prosecuted and punished or pardoned for their abuses.
It then assesses the broader significance of the police commander, Brian Mitchell, receiving
amnesty for his role in a massacre of innocent civilians in Natal and discusses the manner in
which the proportionality requirement for amnesty in terms of the legislation has been jettisoned.
The paper highlights some of the institutional clashes between Attorneys General and the TRC
on the use documents and witnesses in both trials and in amnesty hearings. It also comments on
the particular trial of former Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan. Finally, the paper discusses
the link between the rule of law and the maintenance of a democratic order and the challenge of
impunity and political expediency in South Africa.
A Context for Compromise
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was born out of the compromises of the negotiations
between the African National Congress and the apartheid government of the National Party. The
National Party flatly refused to facilitate democratic elections and to relinquish power if amnesty
was not part of the deal.6 Pardoning the perpetrators of violence in defence of Apartheid formed
a crucial part of these negotiations and was integral to the constitution which eventuated.7
Ostensibly designed to promote reconciliation and national unity, the constitution provided for
legislation to be passed to absolve state criminals and other gross violators of human rights. The
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 34 of 1995 was signed into law by
President Nelson Mandela on 19 July 1995.
Even though this Act repealed all previous legislation dealing with indemnity or amnesty, it
indicated that previous decisions regarding the granting of indemnity would remain in force. The
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, with Desmond Tutu as Chairperson, was established in
terms of the provisions of this Act. Its stated purposes are, "...to promote national unity and
reconciliation in a spirit which transcends the conflicts and divisions of the past". This would
be done by: "(i)... establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent
of the gross violations of human rights ...including the antecedents, circumstances, factors and
contexts of such violations, as well as the perspectives of the victims and the motives and
perspectives of the persons responsible for the commission of the violations, by conducting
investigations and holding hearings; (ii) facilitating the granting of amnesty...; (iii) establishing
and making known the fate or whereabouts of the victims and by restoring the human and civil
dignity of such victims by granting them an opportunity to relate their own accounts of the
violations of which they are the victims and by recommending reparation measures in respect of
them; (iv) compiling a report".8 Three committees and an Investigative Unit were set up to give
effect to the provisions of the act - the Committee on Amnesty, the Committee on Human Rights
Violations and the Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation. The powers and functions of
each of these were clearly defined by the Act.
More than anything else, the question of how we are to deal with those guilty of committing
heinous crimes in defence of and against apartheid has occupied the public mind now that the
revelations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission are compelled into our consciousness
on a daily basis through television broadcasts of the hearings as well as extensive radio and
newspaper coverage of its different aspects. While Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar has been
at pains to insist that amnesty should be granted on a 'morally acceptable basis', others, like
Amnesty Committee member, Wynand Malan, recognise the moral incoherence of granting
amnesty to mass murderers they argue instead that, "..if we want to judge the past on the basis
of superimposing present choices or moral frames...we have no chance of dealing with it - hence
I have totally discarded a moral frame as a basis for reconciliation".9
The mechanisms and procedures for the granting of amnesty are contained in chapter four of the
Act. It makes provision for the establishment of a committee on amnesty appointed by the state
president and constituted by judges and other in legal profession. The committee enjoys a semi-
autonomous relationship to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in that it reports directly
to the state president and though its two ordinary members are Truth Commissioners its three
judges are not (Du Toit, 1997: 9). In terms of the act one may be granted amnesty only for a
crime or offence which you admit that you committed and if it had a clear political objective.
Furthermore, the Act expects, but is not explicit in this regard, that the proportionality of the
crime to the objective pursued should play a role in the determination as to whether a specific
crime could be defined as having a political objective or not. Since there are no guidelines for
the definition of what would reasonably constitute an act proportional to a political objective, the
law is open to various interpretations in this regard. In terms of the Act, also, the crime should
be specified so that a proper (truthful?) account of the history of the country can emerge. The
Act insists on full disclosure of all the relevant facts to the case. If amnesty is granted the
pardon is effective for both criminal and civil prosecution.
Arguments in favour of amnesty almost invariably emphasise pragmatic considerations
concerning the nature of political compromises and the necessity for concessions in terms of the
relative strengths of the contending parties.10 Desmond Tutu (1996) for example avers that,
"...amnesty was a crucial ingredient of the compromise which reversed the country's inevitable
descent into a bloodbath. To repudiate amnesty now would be to tear up the Interim
Constitution". Boraine (1996:7) agrees, "...amnesty is the price we had to pay for peace and
stability., .if negotiations politics had not succeeded the bitter conflict would have continued and
many more human rights violations would have occurred...the alternative was, in my view, far
less desirable and potentially more destructive". Wilhelm Verwoed (1997:7) virtually echoes
these words, "Guaranteeing amnesty is the price we, unfortunately, have to pay for peace, the
common good, for a negotiated settlement in 1994 which led to a democratic South Africa".
The political compromise inherent in the negotiations process was encapsulated in the
constitution. Above all, it provides the framework for a reconciliation of the antecedent conflicts.
This kind of pragmatism accepts that there was a stalemate out of which neither party could
emerge victorious. Under these conditions reconciliation implies that previously held
expectations would be revoked in order to embrace the present in its own right, not merely as a
step to a different order. The constitution lies at the heart of this kind of argument. It sets, from
the perspective of this argument, the framework within which societal conflicts and tensions may
be overcome in the quest for reconciliation and national unity (Hardimon, 1994:87-94).
Following the theological logic characteristic of the TRC, the guilt of the perpetrators and the
shame of the victims ought to be reconciled within a context of forgiveness and for the
betterment of all (Patton, 1985:39-62). On this view pardoning the criminals of Apartheid and
condoning their crimes are necessary for the broader aims of peace and building a united South
Africa.
This pragmatic position is fundamentally flawed for a number of reasons. It reifies the present
as if there are no other possible outcomes. It conceptualises history as an ineluctable process
which does not tolerate alternatives and proceeds somehow without any human agency. The
democratic forces had no choice in the matter - they simply had to compromise on the violence
of Apartheid for the sake of progress at the negotiating table. In the name of being realistic, this
perspective attempts to marginalise the awkward questions about the viability of delivery within
the context of the compromise. If the negotiations and the resultant constitution are taken at face
value and as given, then of course, possibilities for critical evaluation of these processes will
be truncated. In this manner, it is implied that the reality of the present is unchanging. This
inference is then used in a circular fashion to justify the suspension of justice in the granting of
amnesty. The reasoning is circular because it feeds off itself. Amnesty was necessary for the
political compromise which facilitated the adoption of the constitution which in turn provides
for amnesty. The position is normatively sealed to avoid questions about the long term
possibilities for systemic reform. It necessarily sanctions the existing divisions in South African
society in the facile hope that forgiving wrongdoers will create conditions for legitimation of the
new polity.
Courts or Commissions
Both the criminal justice system and the truth and reconciliation commission are ostensibly
engaged in a search for the truth". Their ways part immediately beyond this superficially
common objective. While the TRC tries to reach the truth by promising the perpetrators amnesty
in exchange for a public (or private) admission of their guilt, the criminal justice system seeks
truth through the forensic mechanism of the courts, receiving evidence by means of investigation
and cross-examination and passing sentences on the wrongdoers. The aim is clearly retributive
rather than reconciliatory. Criminals have to be prosecuted for their offences in the hope that
their punishment will somehow act as a deterrent and prevent future wrongdoing by both
offenders in particular cases as well as other prospective offenders. Prosecution and punishment
are legal processes. Amnesty, on the other hand, is an administrative procedure following a set
of criteria as laid down by law, although the amnesty process may display all the trappings of a
juristic process with incumbent judges to interpret the act. The legal process on the other hand
is contested by a wide variety of actors, including police investigators, prosecutors, defence
lawyers, magistrates and judges. In contrast, the Amnesty Committee takes weighty decisions
on the basis of the evidence presented without the benefit of cross-examination and contestation,
certainly not of the sort that would be needed to prosecute wrongdoers in a court of law. While
these decisions may be legally challenged in a court of law, this only marginally affects the
overall working of the amnesty committee.
In an adversarial legal system, such as we have in South Africa, a court case can be conducted
without a word from the accused, as the defence may attempt to protect the suspect by invoking
the right to silence. Yet, in amnesty applications the perpetrator is obliged to talk about the
offences in as frank and open a manner as possible. While the amnesty applicant exposes
criminal behaviour, the suspect in a court case may try to conceal guilt in order to lessen the
sentence when it is imposed. Amnesty is only awarded to those who implicate themselves in the
crimes of the past. If, in the opinion of the Amnesty Committee, an applicant does not provide
a full disclosure of the particular episodes of human rights abuse outlining his/her specific
involvement in it, amnesty will be denied. The truth, on the other hand, may be extremely
harmful to an accused since the court's knowledge of the full nature of the crime may determine
more severe sentences. The court has the obligation to piece together the evidence in an effort
to reconstruct the past as accurately as possible. The Amnesty committee relies on the applicant
to do this for them, with the help of some prompting from the committee members and some
corroborating evidence emerging from research and investigation into the crime. This has
resulted in widely divergent accounts presented by witnesses in court and before the Amnesty
Committee.
There are other complicating factors in the contrast between the criminal justice system and the
amnesty committee in contemporary South Africa. For one, we have to bear in mind that the
legal system has been directly inherited from the previous regime. According to Varney and
Sarkin (1997:142) there is a fundamental crisis in the criminal justice system, stemming from
the lack of perceived legitimacy of the system and its role in maintaining authoritarianism. State
prosecutors, investigators and even judges tolerated the manifestly unjust institutions of
Apartheid. Many also actively colluded in the maintenance of the system, disregarding human
rights abuses and implementing Apartheid laws. Krish Govender of the National Association
of Democratic Lawyers (NADEL) expressed this complicity in the following terms, "It was
common knowledge among progressive lawyers that specific judges were selected to deal with
political cases. Other judges that were at best neutral or could not be manipulated were
conveniently bypassed"12. At the very least, Attorneys General lack the experience for securing
prosecutions now that they do not have on their side a security establishment which could, under
duress and torture, force confessions out of offenders.13 Some judges implicitly condoned the
underhand methods of the security police by allowing evidence extracted on this basis and by
covering up cases of police brutality. In contrasting attorneys general and the judiciary with truth
commissioners and amnesty committee members, it is thus instructive to remember the role of
the former during Apartheid.
The ideal-typical contrast between the criminal justice system and the process of granting
amnesty to perpetrators of violence must be seen against the background of complicity and in the
context of the compromises which brought about a democratic South Africa.14 As may be
expected, while there have been some crucial institutional changes in South Africa in relation to
human rights - the establishment of the constitutional court and the bill of rights - the judiciary
itself has not changed in any fundamental way since 1994. The appointment of Justice Ismail
as Chief Justice presiding over the Appeal Court created a furore as the overwhelming majority
of judges indicated their support for a white colleague. Their support was in vain as the Judicial
Service Commission went ahead and appointed Ismail as the first black Chief Justice in the
country. The unreformed nature of the judiciary was far more pronounced in a similar case in
Kwa-Zulu Natal where an executive member of the powerful secret organisation of
Afrikanerdom, the Broederbond, Judge Willem Booysen, was in the running for the post of
deputy judge president of the provincial judiciary against a black colleague, Judge Vuka
Tshabalala. Fourteen judges of the provincial bench took the very unusual step of writing a letter
indicating their support for the broederbonder Booysen, and making it very clear that Tshabalala
would not, "...command the respect of the other judges in the division and morale would decline"
(Rickard, 1998:12). The response to the apparent intransigence of the judiciary has been varied.
On the one hand there are calls for the ANC to obtain the two-thirds majority in next year's
election to enable it to rewrite the constitution and thus have the power to undermine the
independence of the Judicial Service Commission. This will ensure the 'transformation' of the
bench. Others argue for a more transparent process in which the judiciary has a far more public
role, subject to popular scrutiny and criticism, but independent of the government of the day
(Rickard, 1998:13). Finally, there may also be struggles over terrain as the TRC tries to exercise
its many powers and the Attorneys General attempt to preserve the integrity (sic!) of the criminal
justice system.
Sentenced or Saved13
On 30 April 1992 Brian Mitchell was sentenced to death on eleven counts of murder" and to
imprisonment for three years on each of two counts of attempted murder. At the time of the
offences he was the commander of the police station at New Hanover in the Natal province in
South Africa. He was also secretary of the Joint Management Committee in Pietermaritzburg and
appropriately trained in counter-insurgency methods. These committees had been set up
throughout the country as part of the government's 'total strategy' to combat opposition to
apartheid. They were responsible for the counter-revolutionary strategy of the apartheid
government, part of which included training 'special constables' who could be deployed in their
own communities. Mitchell was involved in a security force operation against the United
Democratic Front in which he had instructed a group of 'special constables' to attack a house in
an area under his jurisdiction known as Trust Feeds. Shortly after the incident it surfaced that
they had attacked the wrong house killing eleven people who had absolutely nothing to do with
the ongoing battles. They were not the intended victims at all". Despite frenetic attempts by
Mitchell's superiors to cover up the blunder, he was eventually brought to justice together with
the four 'special constables'. His death sentences were commuted to thirty-three years
imprisonment on 24 April 1994 merely four days before the first national elections based on
universal franchise in South Africa. In the second week of December 1996, he was granted
amnesty in terms of the provisions of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act
No. 34 of 1995 and pardoned for his crimes at both civil and criminal levels. He had not yet
served five years of his sentence.
The Trust Feeds massacre, Mitchell's involvement in it and his subsequent amnesty raise critical
questions about the nature of South Africa's political transition in relation to the administration
of justice, the pursuance of reconciliation and the quest for unravelling the truth about the
ugliness of South Africa's past. The massacre unambiguously demonstrated the collusion of the
police in acts of heinous violence against opponents in the dying days of apartheid. Mitchell's
amnesty highlights the enormous power of the amnesty committee - to decide whether a
perpetrator will be pardoned or remain punished. It has the authority to undo the work of the
criminal justice system by supposedly replacing retribution with reconciliation based on the
truth18 of full disclosure.
Pardoning Mitchell for his crimes was significant for the amnesty process in a variety of ways.
It showed other similar criminals that amnesty might work for them as well. It is a moot point
whether the result of Mitchell's amnesty was intended or not by the committee. Circumstantially
though it could be argued that committee members were aware of the fact that the (then) closing
date for amnesty applications was merely days away and that hardly any employees of the former
state had applied for amnesty. The process had to appear to be working in order to attract other
prospective applicants and so reveal the truth about other abuses. Mitchell was the first member
the security forces of the apartheid government to be granted amnesty for crimes committed in
the course of his duties. It represented a turning point for many policeman and other state
operatives who had been reluctant to apply for amnesty because they were uncertain about the
way in which amnesty would be interpreted by the committee. Former commissioner of police,
General Johan van der Merwe expressed this apprehension in the following terms:
You take a big risk if you ask for amnesty now, and then you are charged. After that you
can hardly exercise your rights in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act ...to exercise your
right of silence, or to plead not guilty, or to wait and see the evidence."
The Politics of Proportionality
The evidence before the amnesty committee is not admissible in future prosecutions20 in the
event of amnesty being refused. It would, however, be extremely difficult for a perpetrator to
plead not guilty after having incriminated himself in his evidence before the Amnesty Committee
or the Investigative Unit of the TRC? Perpetrators were especially unsure about how the
Amnesty Committee would apply the 'proportionality principle' of the Act according to which
the seriousness of the crime has to be related to the nature of the political objective pursued. As
van der Merwe outlined above, they were also troubled by the possibility that full disclosure of
their crimes, as required for amnesty, would ruin their chances in the courts of law if their
amnesty applications did not succeed. Indeed, even human rights lawyers, like Brian Currin,
were advising their clients (many of whom are perpetrators) not to apply for amnesty.21 Kwa-
Zulu Natal Attorney General Tim McNally indicted Dirk Coetzee and several of his colleagues
in the former security police despite the fact that they had lodged amnesty applications.
Ironically, Tim McNally, had earlier discredited Coetzee as an unreliable witness in his internal
investigation and before the Harms Commission into police death squads. Coetzee was indicted
for something that he had already admitted he had done.22
The legal process of prosecutions and the administrative procedure of granting amnesty crossed
paths at a number of different points with varying consequences for the accused and the victims.
The acquittal of former Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, and others accused of the brutal
massacre of 13 people at the home of United Democratic Front (UDF) activist Victor Ntuli at
KwaMakhutu in Kwa-Zulu Natal, acted as a disincentive to perpetrators, especially those in the
military, to apply for amnesty (Varney and Sarkin, 1997:141). Mitchell's amnesty had the
directly opposite effect. It certainly sped up the process encouraging other state criminals to
apply for amnesty. Effectively, it meant that the 'proportionality principle' of the Act would be
very leniently applied or not applied at all. After all, how were the amnesty committee members
to decide on questions of proportionality? If a mass murderer, like Mitchell, was merely
carrying out orders how were they to establish the various levels of culpability? No doubt, the
work of the Amnesty committee is complicated by the fact that responsibility for human rights
abuses was so thoroughly diffused through the entire system, and dispersed over a wide range
of state functionaries. Also, there are no objective measurements for proportionality - it depends
very largely on moral intuition. It is thus unsurprising that there is very little evidence that
proportionality or proximity are being considered at all as important factors in the granting of
amnesty.23 In considering the amnesty applications of three APLA operatives responsible for the
brutal attack on the Heidelberg Tavern, a favourite spot for local Cape Town students, the
Amnesty Committee found that the applicants complied with the requirements of the act in that:
(i) they were acting on the explicit orders of a publicly known political organisation, (ii) they did
not act for personal gain and (iii) they had no personal knowledge of the victims. The decision
does not mention the condition of proportionality at all.24
Evidence, Truth and Justice
In his judgement in the case of AZAPO and Others v The President of the Republic of South
Africa and Others, deputy president of the Constitutional Court, Justice Mahomed made the
following statement:25
Central to the justification of amnesty in respect of criminal prosecution for offences
committed during the prescribed period with political objectives, is the appreciation that
truth will not effectively be revealed by the wrongdoers if they are to be prosecuted for
such acts. That justification must necessarily and unavoidably apply to the need to
indemnify such wrongdoers against civil claims for payment of damages. Without that
incentive the wrongdoer cannot be encouraged to reveal the whole truth which might
inherently be against his or her material or proprietary interests.
The decisions of the committee do not involve a great deal of detailed evidence at all - certainly
not of the sort that usually accompanies criminal prosecution in a court of law. This is not
surprising. Amnesty has been used as an incentive for the perpetrators to tell the truth, to reveal
the full horror of past violations of human rights. It does not make much sense to offer such an
inducement to political criminals only to remove it if they do not meet the further requirements
of the Act. This would defeat the initial purpose of the incentive. It is far more expedient to
simply apply amnesty by the line of least resistance, and in so doing, deviate from the Act itself.26
Amnesty has to appear to be working, if is to act as an incentive to perpetrators. The only sure
way in which it would appear to be working is if state criminals and other perpetrators are
actually allowed to (literally) get away with murder. Cynically stated, since we are incapable of
administering justice, of prosecuting the criminals, we should rather attempt to lure them into
revealing their crimes and exposing what their roles were in the violence of the past. These very
same perpetrators may then walk free without even showing remorse for their actions. Bishop
Desmond Tutu (1996) thus appealed to perpetrators to apply for amnesty, "(T)he law doesn't
require that they should express remorse: they can come to the Amnesty Committee and say, for
example, that they fought a noble struggle for liberation, but that because they opened themselves
to prosecution or civil actions as a result, they are asking for amnesty." This is cynical because
remorse is supposedly one of the imperatives for genuine reconciliation. If remorse is jettisoned,
what manner of reconciliation can be accomplished?
Those perpetrators who were not persuaded by Mitchell's amnesty to approach the TRC
voluntarily were compelled do so by the threat of subpoena to appear before the TRC. There
were two further catalysts encouraging eligible applicants to apply for amnesty. Firstly, the cut
off point covered by the amnesty provisions was extended to 10 May 1994. Secondly, the fact
that the Constitutional Court ruled in favour of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and
against AZAPO and others on the constitutionality of the granting of amnesty. However, as the
process gained momentum, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission came into direct conflict
with Attorneys General who were in the process of investigating criminal cases against the
applicants. In some cases like that of Hechter, Cronje, van Vuuren and Mentz, the Transvaal
Attorney General, Dr J D'Oliviera, had already issued warrants of arrest for their roles in 27
cases of murder, attempted murder and malicious damage to property, when they approached the
Amnesty Committee with their applications. They have appeared before both the Supreme Court
as well as the Amnesty Committee. In terms of the Act, the matter has been postponed by the
Supreme Court pending the outcome of their amnesty application27.
The cases of Hechter, Cronje, Van Vuuren and Mentz bear testimony to the tensions between the
offices of the Attorneys General and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. After extensive
investigations, indeed at about the time that the investigations against them were finalised, Dr
D'Oliviera,28 claims that he was on the verge of prosecuting these men when they "...like skelms
ran to the TRC to save their own skins". The Act recommends that the Committee on Amnesty
may request a prosecutional authority to suspend proceeding against a suspect pending the
outcome of the amnesty application29. The vague wording of the legislation has allowed
Attorneys General considerable discretionary powers. It is also the source of much friction
between the TRC and the criminal justice system as they struggle over the various interpretations
of the Act. Attorneys General complain that the TRC process undermines their work in a variety
of ways. The Truth Commission has the power to subpoena any witness and to get access to any
document which may be necessary in its investigation of a particular case. The disclosure of
such information may hinder the case of the state if defence lawyers are alerted by the premature
exposure of evidence when witnesses appear before the amnesty committees. Prosecutions under
such circumstances are deleteriously affected.30 Yet are we in a position to prosecute? What
evidence exists against the perpetrators?31
In his judgement against A2AP0 and Others Justice Mahomed makes a sweeping statement
about a lack of evidence in respect of all cases, "(A)ll that often effectively remains is the truth
of wounded memories of loved ones sharing instinctive suspicions, deep and traumatising to the
survivors but otherwise incapable of translating themselves into objective and corrobarative
evidence which could survive the rigours of the law".32 Amnesty Committee member, Wynand
Malan, however argues that the police were on the verge of prosecutions in many of the cases
anyway and that the amnesty application have not revealed a great deal about the atrocities of the
past.33 In reality the situation is more uneven for the courts and for the Amnesty Committee.
There have been some spectacular convictions (De Kock, Barnard) and some dismal failures
(Malan, Nkabinde).34 Similarly, there have been some dramatic revelations (PEBCO three) in
the amnesty applications and some responses from perpetrators designed to obscure or conceal
their roles in the killings. By and large the latter have come from the defence force rather than
the police. They have proven to be a much harder nut to crack even if their sinister experiments
in chemical and biological warfare and some aspects of the role of the Civil Cooperation Bureau
(CCB) have now been exposed. Yet, the narratives remain contested as the memories of
perpetrators fade and as they try to retain some sense of moral worth by not disclosing the full
horror of their deeds. There are still many unanswered questions relating mostly to the link
between the politicians and the security operatives, between those who made the policies and
those who pulled the triggers.
While the Attorneys General complain about interference in their work, the gripe of the
Investigative Unit of the TRC on the other hand, is that their work of reconciliation is hampered
when Attorneys General refuse to hand over witnesses or documents.35 The equivalent to
amnesty in the course of the administration of justice is an indemnity offered in terms of section
204 of the Criminal Procedure Act. This involves suspects who are prepared to become state
witnesses against their accomplices in exchange for not being prosecuted in specific cases.
Indemnity, however differs from amnesty in one extremely important respect. While amnesty
pardons the perpetrator at both civil and criminal levels, indemnity only pardons the perpetrator
at a criminal level. The human right of the victims and survivors to launch civil claims against
the perpetrator remains intact. The notorious askari36 Joe Mamasela is one such state witness.
He has not applied for amnesty but has given evidence against other members of the security
establishment. In a case like this the TRC petitions the relevant prosecutional authority for the
release of the state witness in order that he/she may testify in an amnesty application. Upon
completion of the hearing, the state witness is returned to the prosecutional authority. This is
especially required when it is considered that the evidence of the state witness may differ
fundamentally with that of the amnesty applicants.
Most recently, the Attorney General for the Transvaal, Dr Jan D'Oliviera, released Joe
Mamasela to give evidence before the Amnesty Committee in the case of five former security
policemen.37 They are applying for amnesty for the murder of the PEBCO three.38 Mamasela's
version of events has contradicted their version in a number of important respects. While
admitting that they killed the three civic activists, the policemen deny having tortured them. In
contrast, Mamasela insists that they were severely tortured, going into the most gruesome details
of their suffering before they were killed. One may ask why these security policemen would risk
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prosecution by not providing a full disclosure of their abuses. Would it not be in their interests
to simply bare all and get freedom in exchange for the truth? There are a variety of ways in
which we may speculate about their reasons for emerging with a polished 'story' which they have
obviously rehearsed over and over. This ploy may have worked if there is balance of probability
in their favour. However with an eye witness contradicting their version of the violations their
story appears improbable and certainly not a full disclosure. I would be surprised if they get
amnesty. While the Amnesty committee may have unconsciously (or consciously- who knows?)
decided to abandon proportionality and proximity they appear to have applied the requirement
of full disclosure very consistently. If there is even a hint that part of the story has been distorted
or hidden, the Amnesty Committee has not granted amnesty.
The clash between the justice system and the TRC process does not only involve criminal cases.
Craig Williamson, spy for the former regime who penetrated the ANC hierarchy in exile,
admitted that he and his colleagues killed Jeanette and Katherine Schoon with a parcel bomb in
Southern Angola. Soon after this admission was published in the popular media in 1995, Marius
Schoon, the bereaved husband and father, launched civil proceedings against Williamson. In
response, the latter has applied for amnesty in order to dodge the civil suit against him. These
instances prompted Transvaal Attorney General to assert, "(O)bviously, the Truth Commission
already interferes with our work, so any extensions will have far-reaching implications".3' In
contrast to this interpretation, Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar, argues, that, "(T)he role of South
Africa's courts of law and prosecutional authority remains firmly in place...The role of the
criminal justice system is unaffected by the bill".40
Besides the obvious acrimony involved when the work of these two institutions so clearly
clashes, there are instances of sound cooperation as well. The Attorneys General may call on the
TRC not to exercise its powers in cases where prosecutions are imminent and the TRC can
likewise request the Attorneys General refrain from proceeding with prosecutions while they
dispose of an amnesty application. Dr D'Oliviera did not execute the warrant of arrest for Katisa
Cebekulu to allow him to enter the country from England in order to testify in the TRC hearing
regarding the human rights violations of the Mandela United Football team.41
The institutional conflict between the criminal justice system and the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission raises broader questions about the nature of democracy and the possibilities for
establishing the rule of law in South Africa. The episodes outlined above suggest that there are
ample opportunities for perpetrators to avoid civil or criminal prosecution by simply applying
for amnesty. On the face of it, the deal appears ludicrous. Criminals simply need to tell the truth
before the Amnesty Committee in order for justice not take its course.42 The wider social
implications of not prosecuting criminals needs to be seriously considered in relation to the
impact of impunity on the fragile democratic order in South Africa. Amnesty sends a message
to future state criminals that there is the chance that they may be exonerated especially if they
remain in power long enough to ensure that they are not easily dislodged, or that some
compromise may be necessary to remove them from power. Needless to say, it is a message with
grave consequences for democracy.43
Victims and Violators
It could be argued that the major accomplishments of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
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in South Africa (TRC) are twofold. Firstly, it has achieved a widespread public exposure of the
human rights abuses of the Apartheid regime. Secondly, it has given ordinary people the
opportunity to voice their suffering. No longer can anybody deny knowledge of these atrocities.
Simultaneously, victims and survivors have had some sense of human dignity restored. No
doubt, the effect of these achievements has been far-reaching. The manner in which the
perpetrators should be dealt with has elicited a variety of different responses from the survivors
and the families of the victims. Some have asked for nothing more than the names of the
perpetrators in order to know who they should forgive, others have demanded that justice should
be done and that the perpetrators should be criminally convicted and prosecuted for civil redress,
some have wanted revenge, others have asked for bursaries for their children, for a proper burial
for the slain and for tombstones to mark the graves.44
Hidden in the wide variety of responses of the victims and survivors are broader concerns about
how to forge a normative framework with respect for human rights and, at the same time, deal
with the perpetrators of crimes both in defence of Apartheid as well as in the struggle against it.
There are always difficulties when an authoritarian regime makes way for a democratic order
based on universal franchise with a bill of rights. One of the gravest of these in South Africa is
how to initiate respect for the legislative process, the rule of law and the institutions responsible
for implementing these laws. Extensive state inspired violence has undermined the very basis
of a democratic order. The Apartheid state had a monopoly over the use of force and its
instruments of repression were systematically used against the mass of the population so as to
maintain their disfranchisement. This is not to suggest that Apartheid was distinguished by
violence only. There were a variety of other mechanisms of subjection which allowed a white
minority to rule over a subordinate black majority45. Yet, despite the very broad precincts of
Apartheid rule, crimes of violence were committed by its functionaries. Over and above the
'violence of normal times' (Barrington-Moore, 1966) apartheid also spawned a security system
which acted with impunity against the mass of the population.
The TRC has shoved this simple reality, obviously known by only those immediately affected
by it, to the centre stage of public attention. However, it has concentrated on isolating cases of
specific abuse and treated them on an individual basis rather than presenting an analysis of the
generalised impact of apartheid on the mass of the population as a context for these abuses. I
think there is a possibility for doing both. We should distinguish the direct subjects of human
rights violations from the disenfranchised majority who have suffered, in very tangible ways, as
a result of the ordinary working of the system of Apartheid - forced removals, pass laws, influx
control, educational discrimination, residential segregation and a battery of other measures for
the control over the subject population. They are very clearly victims too? Mamdani (1996)
makes the telling point that there were relatively few perpetrators of state violence in South
Africa, yet there were very many beneficiaries of the system of apartheid. Similarly, there are
relatively few victims of direct state crimes but a whole population who suffered under apartheid.
It is thus imperative that the metaphor of victims and violators should be placed in the context
of the 'violence of normal times'. What made these abuses possible? How can we prevent them
from happening in the future? It is necessary to examine both the dynamics of apartheid
generally as well as the specific episodes of human rights violations so that we can appreciate
the need for both the systemic reform as well as individual empathy for the direct victims of
apartheid atrocities. Yet, guilt has to be individualised. Criminals, and especially state criminals
have to bear responsibility for specific crimes and be held accountable for these in order to
preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system. It is a major argument of this paper that
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democracy cannot be realised without such accountability.
Contemporary Challenges and Crises
(instead of a conclusion)
According to Nino (1996:146-147) following Shklar, there are a number of advantages of the
criminal justice system over truth commissions. It would assist our understanding to list these
and then try to assess their relevance to the South African situation.
Firstly, truth commissions cannot replicate the "quality of narration" of an adversarial trial. I
would argue that this would depend on the quality of cross-examination in court or the depth of
the confession before the Amnesty Committee. I do not think that our narratives of the past will
necessarily be enriched by criminal tribunals in the South African case where attorneys general
and state prosecutors are usually no match for sophisticated defence lawyers. Secondly, trials
further the rule of law, especially when the meticulous attention to court detail and procedure is
counterposed with the lawlessness of the authoritarian predecessors who may now be suspects,
accused or defendants. Yet, the assumption here is that the courts are impartial. Where we have
a criminal justice system inherited so entirely from the previous regime, this is not the case.
Instead, hidden agendas, the political history of some Attorneys General and judges, their cosy
existence with the authoritarianism of Apartheid do make this point stick in contemporary South
Africa. Thirdly, trials replace the impulse towards private revenge, since there is a public
perception that justice is being done. Finally, trials assist victims to recover their self-worth and
respect as the story of their suffering is given public exposure and official sanction. In South
Africa, I would argue that the statements before the Committee on Human Rights Violations
have gone a long way towards realising this aim. However, they are blighted by the absence of
perpetrators at the hearings. Altogether 7 124 amnesty applications have been received by the
Committee on Amnesty. As at December last this year, S i l l of these have been dealt with and
of these only 216 applications have been successful.4'
Cynics may ask whether it is worth all the trouble - the enormous public interest, the media
exposure, the state expenditure, the endless debates - for merely 216 amnesties. According to
the Human Rights Commission's submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, about
15 000 people died in politically-inspired violence between 1990 and 1994 - hardly a peaceful
transition. Nyanisile Jack, a formerTRC researcher, takes this argument somewhat further in
suggesting that the underlying reason for the conception of a peaceful transition is trie fact that
relatively few whites died in the conflict. On this perspective, it is quite easy to erase these
deaths as irrelevant to the democratisation of the country, in order to arrive at the blithe
conclusion that the transition was "...relatively peaceful... and miraculous" (Verwoed, 1997:1).
In Kwa Zulu-Natal alone, Ari Silas, points out that nearly 17 00 people lost their lives in political
violence. If so very few people have been officially pardoned for these murders does this imply
that the rest have been prosecuted. Sadly not. Especially in KwaZulu-Natal, the TRC has been
spectacularly unsuccessful47 in getting people to come forward to testify before the Committee
on Human Rights Violations or to apply for amnesty. Similarly, the criminal justice system has
left thousands of cases unsolved. How is democracy to survive in a situation of such
monumental impunity? There is no respect for the rule of law and the three agencies of the
criminal justice system, the police, the courts and the prisons, are simply incapable of coping
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with the crisis, themselves fraught with problems of legitimacy, being so firmly rooted in the
past. Needless to say, there is no respect there for the TRC process of reconciliation either.
Neither justice no reconciliation is on the immediate political agenda of this province. A whole
host of questions and challenges are posed by this situation. These revolve around the main issue
of exceptionalism. Is KwaZulu-Natal a special case worthy of a special amnesty? If a special
peace is brokered in the province it would mean the most severe test for the TRC process and,
of course, it will have far-reaching consequences for the administration of justice as truth
commissioner Richard Lyster comments "(I)t sends a completely wrong message about what
happens when you kill people. It sends a fundamentally bad message about the notion of justice
in this province when you have police, magistrates and judges who are pushed aside, and
politicians essentially decide whom to prosecute and whom to giver amnesty to".48
Exceptionalism is anathema to the notion of the rule of law, one of the cornerstones of any
democratic order. Indeed, the constitution guarantees that everybody should be treated equally
before the law. Thus, if a separate peace or special amnesty is brokered in KwaZulu-Natal there
would be nothing stopping anybody else from demanding the same blanket pardon. The result
would turn the entire TRC process into a fiasco. It is thus far more likely that inertia will simply
set in and that the least possible will be done about the situation.
There are other challenges and crises to the legitimacy of the TRC process. Not least of these
relates to the partiality of the committee in granting amnesty to 37 ANC members, including
Thabo Mbeki. Although the applications were individual in the sense that each member
submitted a separate application form, they did not conform to the requirement of the act for full
disclosure of specific acts or omissions for which amnesty was being sought. Instead, the
applications provided no detail on the identity of those involved nor the particular offences. Mr
Wally Serote, for example had been granted amnesty for "...acts unknown to me unless stated
otherwise by individual amnesty applicants". Peter Mokaba asked for and was granted amnesty
for offences "...as detailed by individual applicants who may implicate me".49 The successful
challenge to the legality of these amnesties came from the TRC itself, the Democratic Party and
the National Party. Since the Committee on Amnesty is autonomous, the TRC had no option
but to challenge the amnesties in court. Although the ANC initially opposed the TRC's
application to have the amnesties overturned, it withdrew its opposition soon before the matter
was to be heard at the High Court in Cape Town. The TRC was to have appointed a new panel
to review the 37 amnesty applications. The applicants will be asked for full details on the
offences and the new panel will then decide, in terms of the Act, whether these are hearable cases
(gross violations of human rights) or whether they may be dealt with administratively (minor
offences).
The gravest challenge to the process of reconciliation in South Africa remains the cleavages
between the wealthy and the poor and the fact that these coincide, by and large, with the
distinction between black and white. As long as the society is fractured by these same
inequalities the chances for reconciliation are indeed very slim. Democracy has to mean
something materially for the mass of people, mainly through a recognition of their second
generation rights. This does not imply a certain entitlement, but that the opportunity for success
should be equalised. This is the surest manner to broaden the basis of consent and to protect the
democratic order.
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Notes
1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Sociological Association
conference in Montreal, August, 1998.
2. In this regard, Thabo Mbeki attempts to morally exonerate Winnie Madikizela-Mandela for
her crimes by insisted that they took place within a particular context in the same manner as the
agents of Apartheid try to situate their crimes within the framework of a war mentality.
3. Minister of Justice Dullah Omar makes this point in the following manner, "The Nats simply
refused to negotiate if they did not get amnesty. They were pushing for a blanket amnesty but
we rejected this notion and argued instead for the kind of process as we now have in the TRC".
Interview, Cape Town, 19 August 1997.
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4. The Interim Constitution, Act No 200 of 1993 provides that, "...amnesty shall be granted in
respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and committed in the
course of the conflicts of the past. To this end Parliament under the constitution shall adopt a law
determining a firm cut-off date...and providing mechanisms, criteria and procedures, including
tribunals, if any, through which such amnesty shall be dealt with at any time after the law has
been passed".
5. Reconciliation through Truth is the driving motto of the TRC.
6. Dullah Ornar thus described the process, "Amnesty was a compromise position in negotiations
to allow for the process of democratisation to continue. Even though we recognised that amnesty
may be counter-productive to the establishment of the rule of law, the balance of forces
compelled this compromise to allow elections to take place". Interview with Minister of Justice
Dullah Omar, Cape Town, 19 August 1998.
7. South African history is punctuated with examples of indemnity being granted, or, at least,
policies of leniency being observed, after instances of state violence. The turbulent conflicts in
the Anglo-Boer War and the two world wars, the Bulhoek Massacre of 1921, the suppression of
the White Miner's Strike of 1922, the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 and the political repression
of the Soweto revolt were all followed by some or other form of official exemption from criminal
or civil prosecution for the functionaries of the state and other sympathisers (Hendricks, 1997)
8. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 34 of 1995, Chapter 2, (3).
9. Hansard, 17 May 1995, pl339. Interview with Wynand Malan, Johannesburg,
10. See Hendricks (1998: ' ) for a discussion of other arguments in favour of amnesty and
against it.
11. The different ways in which the concept of truth is employed by the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and the criminal justice system in relation to the manner in which the concept has
been philosophically treated is the subject of another paper.
12. Weekly Mail and Guardian, 9 May 1996.
13. Commenting on why McNally lost the Malan trial, The Weekly Mail and Guardian, October
18,1996 suggest that, "It is far more likely that his failure to secure any convictions in the Malan
trial resulted more from a lack of competence in the hard work of prosecution - digging for
evidence, finding the proper witnesses, covering all elements of the offence and ensuring no
gaps, and diligent and searching cross-examination".
14. See Dugard (1978:280) for a sustained analysis of the role of the judiciary during Apartheid.
He questions the independence of the judiciary, especially after 1955 when the Appellate
Division was expanded to reflect Afrikaner nationalist interests, and argues that the judges
preferred interpreting legislation in such a way that it would facilitate the task of the executive
rather than defend the freedoms (such as there were) of the individual and uphold the rule of law.
15. Besides literally saving his skin, Mitchell has also tried to 'save' his soul by joining a
charismatic Christian sect.
16. The following are the names of the murdered: Mseleni Ntuli, Dudu Shangase, Zetha
Shangase, Nkoyeni Shangase, Muzi Shangase, Filda Ntuli, Fukile Zondi, Maritz Xaba, Sara
18
rather than defend the freedoms (such as there were) of the individual and uphold the rule of law.
15. Besides literally saving his skin, Mitchell has also tried to 'save' his soul by joining a
charismatic Christian sect.
16. The following are the names of the murdered: Mseleni Ntuli, Dudu Shangase, Zetha
Shangase, Nkoyeni Shangase, Muzi Shangase, Filda Ntuli, Fukile Zondi, Maritz Xaba, Sara
Nyoka, Alfred Zita and Sisedewu Sithole.
17. The blunder also reveals the monumental ineptitude of the security forces, but this is not
central to our analysis.
18. The advertising slogan of the TRC is "reconciliation through truth".
19. Weekly Mail and Guardian, 26 July 1996.
20. Promotion of National unity and Reconciliation Act No.34 of 1995, Chapter 6, Clause 31 (3).
21. Weekly Mail and Guardian, 26 July 1996.
22. See Pauw (1991:142) for a detailed account of police death squads and the complicity of the
political and legal establishment in cover-ups.
23. If 1 may allow my own subjectivity to creep in here. The APLA (military wing of the PAC)
operatives who were responsible for the St James Church massacre in Cape Town were recently
granted amnesty. Even if, by some obscure logic, killing people attending Sunday mass could
be construed as a political act - the question remains - what proportionality exists between this
massacre and the objective of political emancipation?
24. TRC-list@www.truth.org.za, 16 July 1998.
25. Constitutional Court of South Africa, case CCT 17/96.
26. Head of the Investigative Unit, Dumisa Ntsebeza, is of the opinion that nobody would be
granted amnesty if the law is interpreted in the strictest sense. Interview, 12 June 1998.
27. Interview with Dr J D'Oliviera, 10 June 1998.
28. Interview with Dr J D'Oliviera, 10 June 1998
29. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 34 of 1995, 19 (7).
30. Interview with Dr J D'Oliviera, 10 June 1998
31. There is compelling evidence to suggest that many official records, especially those of the
security establishment guilty of direct human rights abuses, have been destroyed in order to
conceal the truth. In their submission to the Department of Justice on the draft bill for the
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation, the South African Society of Archivists
suggested the establishment of a Committee on Official and Confiscated Records. It was felt that
the lack of evidence would severely undermine the work of the Truth and Reconciliation
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Commission and thus necessary for the Commission to investigate as precisely as possible, who
was responsible for the shredding of documents who authorised this practice and how widespread
was it. Unfortunately, this recommendation was not incorporated into the Act. Apparently, this
critical issue has been removed from the operational side of the work of the TRC and despatched
to its research division.
32. Constitutional Court of South Africa, case CCT 17/96.
33. Interview with Wynand Malan.
34. It may not be entirely incidental that the failures have been in KwaZulu-Natal where
violence is on the upsurge and the convictions have been in Gauteng where political violence has
declined, but this is the subject for another paper.
35. Interview with Commissioner Dumisa Ntsebeza, 12 June 1998.
36. Askari is a Swahili word meaning black soldier. It has taken on a rather different meaning
in South Africa, where it now refers to ex-guerillas of the liberation movement who had, for a
variety of reasons, abandoned their fellow combatants and the struggle generally to join the
security forces of the state.
37. Niewoudt, Du Plessis, Lotz, van Zyl and Snyman.
38. Qaqawali Godolozi, Sipho Hashe and Champion Galela were respectively the president,
secretary-general and organiser of the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO). They
were murdered after being lured by the security police to the Port Elizabeth airport under the
pretext that they were to meet a British diplomat.
39. Interview with Dr J D'Oliviera, 10 June 1998.
40. Hansard Second Reading debate of The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation
Bill, 17 May 1995 pg 1341.
41. Interview with Dr J D'Oliviera, 10 June 1998.
42. In an earlier paper I argued that amnesty amounted to justice being jettisoned, because
criminals are not prosecuted but, more importantly, also because the constitutionally guaranteed
human right of the victims to launch civil suits against the perpetrators has been annulled by the
provisions for amnesty. (Hendricks, 1997)
43. It is not clear whether this applies to other criminals as well - not only those who are
employed by the state. It would make a fascinating sociological study to investigate whether
there is any significant association between absolving state criminals and the level of violent
crime in South Africa.
44. An empirical analysis of public opinion in this regard based on solid survey data would shed
much light on this issue. It begs to be done.
45. See Therborn (1985 ) for a perspicuous typology of such mechanisms in a discussion on the
complexity of the relation between force and consent.
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46. www.tnith.org.za/amnesty.hun. 20 April 1999.
47. No doubt part of the reason for this is the fact that the Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP) has
adopted a policy of non co-operation with the TRC.
48. Weekly Mail and Guardian, 14 January 1997.
49. Http://www.woza.co.za/dp90.htm, 4 December 1997.
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